The Commonwealth government has offered support to farmers in the form of structural or business adjustment-type schemes since the Loan (Farmers Debt Adjustment) Acts of 1935Acts of -1971. Since 1971 a series of more comprehensive rural reconstruction/adjustment schemes with a range of objectives from debt alleviation to encouraging some exits from agricultural industries, has been in place. While having little direct impact on the structure of these industries, the various schemes have been politically important and an indicator of how core values relating to agricultural production and rural life have changed. A review of the schemes shows an increasing focus on improving farm productivity and sustainability, accompanied by a discourse emphasising the need to promote the 'farm business', rather than to protect the 'family farm'. On the other hand, governments have also used these schemes to deliver 'welfare' outputs.
In common with agricultural producers throughout the developed world, Australian farmers have faced declining farm terms of trade for decades as their costs of production have increased faster than prices received for their output.
Unlike their Western European and North American counterparts, Australian governments from the 1970s sought to ease the process of adjustment to changing conditions, rather than insulate farmers from market signals. One of the important mechanisms for facilitating adjustment while ameliorating its worst impacts has been a series of rural adjustment schemes. These rural adjustment programs have generally provided short to medium term funding, as either grants or loans, intended to induce the re-deployment of labour, movement out of an industry by some, usually smaller firms (farm businesses), and the business and/or physical restructuring of the remaining firms. An explicit goal of the programs is the creation of a sector in which most of the remaining firms operate efficiently and more importantly, self-sufficiently. According to the most obvious indicators the programs have contributed little to achieving this objective. There has been an unbroken sequence of modern rural adjustment programs for more than 33 years, with debt relief dating back further to the 1930s, with little prospect that these programs will be phased out anytime soon. Indeed, the Commonwealth government is delivering yet another 'rescue' package for the sugar industry in 2004, a mere three and a half years since the last $83 million was allocated, '…to work towards positioning the industry to ensure its long term viability' (Truss 2000) .
Over the years, the various programs have been regularly reviewed and altered but never wound up, as has been the case with most other sectoral adjustment packages. Adjustment programs are maintained as base level funding vehicles into which additional money can be poured during periods of peak political demand, as was the case with the sugar adjustment package following the conclusion of the 'free' trade agreement with the US. That is, when there are biophysical or political 'shocks' in particular agricultural industries or regions, governments can increase funding, thereby helping to preserve the family farm.
If, where and when there are reasonable financial conditions or limited political agitation, then programs are adjusted so as to encourage farmers to be more 'business like'. Nonetheless, the programs have struggled to meet the apparently conflicting objectives of meeting the welfare needs of the farm family while encouraging the farm business to become more productive and self reliant.
From Closer Settlement to Reconstruction
The changes in the rural adjustment programs reflect an increasing acceptance of neo-liberal principles, at least by policy-makers, and a diminution of the sort of agrarian mercantilism that dominated rural policy from 1788 to the 1970s.
Colonial and later, state governments, allocated land, dictated the conditions of use and then subsidised and protected agricultural production. These 'closer settlement' schemes were conceived in ignorance of the nature of Australian soils and seasons and, in some cases, market conditions and transport costs (Wadham 1947; Davidson 1981) . The social goals of the various schemes were often admirable, including: the desire to reform convicts (Connors 1970 and Shaw, 1990) ; to spread 'civilisation' (Lake 1987); to promote egalitarianism so as to diminish class conflict (Callaghan & Millington 1956 and Lake 1987) ; to provide employment in depressions; and to reward returned soldiers (Lake 1987). These goals were embodied in and to be achieved through a class of 'yeoman' farmers (Pike 1962) . While new (to Australia) agricultural industries were developed and closer settlement arguably reduced unemployment and class tensions at critical times, it has long been difficult to keep the yeomanry on the land.
Most of the first fleet farmers left the budding agricultural sector within 5 years of settlement, a pattern that was repeated in the 1820s and 1830s (Shaw 1990: 1-3) .
The post-gold rush settlement schemes resulted in high rates of adjustment within 20 years (Davidson 1981) , as did the first soldier settlement scheme (Commonwealth Government 1949: 6) . These instances can be explained as resulting from inexperienced farmers, with limited capital, operating before the biophysical conditions were understood and suitable cultivars had been developed. These were contributing factors but there were and still are the impacts of the underlying economic forces evident in even protected agricultural markets. Farm input costs tend to rise more quickly than commodity prices, to produce what is commonly known as the 'cost-price squeeze' (Campbell 1964) .
There is a 'treadmill effect' (Gow 1993), whereby farmers, having limited control over prices try to reduce costs in order to maintain profits. This can be done by switching enterprises, introducing new technology or by amalgamating farms in pursuit of economies of scale.
Switching enterprises, such as from grazing to grain production or from grain to cotton does help to maintain farmer numbers, given that these changes usually require more intensive labour use in the short to medium term. This, however, provides only temporary relief from the cost-price squeeze and the competitive pressures produced by perpetual innovation. Eventually in even the more intensive industries there are amalgamations. Once industries reach the limits of the natural resource capacity, whether that is due to soil type, climate, available irrigation water or a combination of all three, the capacity to switch enterprises is limited and so amalgamation remains the only option and consequently industry adjustment takes place. Even if prices are fixed by intervention or subsidy, the increasing costs will erode profitability unless there are commensurate increases in assistance and/or levels of protection.
Some of the problems associated with closer settlement were recognised as early as an 1821 report (Davidson 1981:138) (BAE 1971: 20) .
The resulting 1971 Rural Reconstruction Scheme (RRS) allowed for debt reconstruction and farm build-up as recommended by the BAE and it also contained a program for 'rehabilitation' grants, which was a direct inducement for farmers to leave agricultural industries. More than 21,000 applications for assistance in the various program categories were received from 1971-76, but there were only 300 applicants for the rehabilitation grants, of which 197 were approved. Perhaps the maximum of $2700 was too little incentive to leave compared with the rewards for the successful applicants for debt reconstruction who received an average of $37,000, while those eligible for farm build-up got an average of $46,000. Alternatively, perhaps the scheme provided an opportunity to apply for 'soft' finance and farmers responded accordingly. Forty per cent of applicants for what were effectively subsidised loans were successful. Of the 59
per cent of applicants who were refused either debt reconstruction or farm build-up assistance, about one third were said to be unviable (IAC 1984: 180 The total number of farm business units fell by 7.5 per cent between 1971 and 1976 and given that the total production area increased, this implies significant aggregation during this period. 'Natural' adjustment however was more than 70 times greater than assisted adjustment. It could be argued that the 3261 farm build-up approvals may have indirectly 'paid' for some voluntary exits but at most this would bring the 'assisted' exits up to 24 per cent of total exits. While doing little to directly reduce the number of farmers, the Rural Reconstruction Scheme (RRS) contained three indicators of likely policy directions. First, the implicit assumption was that bigger farms would generally be more viable farms and as a consequence there could be, and perhaps should be, fewer farmers.
Secondly, the Federal Government intended to drive reconstruction policy using devolved funding, though this allowed for differences between states in administration of the RRS (Threlfall 1977) Thirdly, the RRS legislation contained sunset clauses and a requirement for review, suggesting that reconstruction
was not an open-ended commitment.
From Reconstruction to Adjustment
The Whitlam Government commissioned a green paper on Rural Policy in Australia, the first attempt at unified rural policy since the 1940s, which flagged an even greater concentration on efficiency and acknowledged the need for industry adjustment (Harris et al, 1974, S3.4) . However, it still contained explicit reference to the welfare needs of farm families, justifying government intervention on the basis that action may be required '…to avoid or mitigate the severe welfare problems which can arise as a result of the unimpeded action of market forces ' (Harris et al. 1974: 203) . The Government revamped the MDFRS to create the Dairy Adjustment Program (DAP). Amalgamation and adjustment remained part of the program but new components included funds for upgrading milk-handling equipment, diversification, property development and relocation assistance (Threlfall 1977: 189) . Once again, the demand for the programs relating to a shift out of the industry, or to another area or to a reduced involvement in the industry, was very limited. The big demand was for finance that could improve efficiency or keep the business operating. In the two years of operation, only 125 dairy farmers applied for some form of exit or partial exit assistance. This was despite a broadening of the assessment criteria in April 1976. Nonetheless, it could be argued that this program was one more step towards a more market-oriented approach. In particular, the concessional finance for bulk milk conversion, development and farm build-up was directed towards creating a more 'efficient' sector.
The incoming Coalition Government, with a still powerful Country/National Party component, did 'redress' some of Whitlam's rural policies (Watson 1979: 167) but its members were unwilling or unable to halt the review of the reconstruction schemes which provided the blueprint for the first sector-wide 'adjustment' program. Apart from the fruit reconstruction schemes, which were terminated after a few years, all other strands of reconstruction were incorporated into the Rural Adjustment Scheme in 1977. The states' existing Rural
Reconstruction Authorities continued to administer the program but there was an extra incentive for the authorities to tighten their lending criteria and reduce debt write-offs (Threlfall 1977: 197) . The provision of 'soft' finance remained, through the programs for debt reconstruction, farm build-up and farm development but the criterion of 'long-term viability' applied. Carry-on loans were available for specific areas/industries but only on a short-term basis. So the restrictions on finance increased slightly, as did the incentives for industry exit.
Rehabilitation loans (convertible to grants) were set at a maximum of $5000 and a new welfare initiative, Household Support was set at a maximum of $3000, amended to $5000 in 1979 (Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport
References Committee 1994). The emphasis now was not so much on saving most farmers but on saving the viable farmer (IAC 1984: 18 ' (IAC 1984: 69) .
The Commission recommended: that access to the scheme be restricted; the preferred form of funding should be grants; as these would be cheaper to administer and would allow the recipients greater choice in spending the money; assistance should be provided to regional or industry 'black spots'; and there should be regular program reviews (IAC 1984: 72-73 program. Farm productivity money was to be used by farmers to increase the capacity, efficiency and sustainability of farms. Successful applicants had to be viable and have formal property plans. Other programs to boost productivity, training grants of up to $500 and professional advice subsidies, were to increase the managerial and technical skills of producers. There was provision for land trading, whereby state authorities could buy and sell land to speed up the process of amalgamation, or even to retire land from agricultural production. This was rarely used except in Western Australia.
Re-establishment grants were retained with a maximum of $45,000 and there were also grants for professional re-location advice. Successful re-establishment applicants had increased from about 50 in 1984 to more than 400 in 1994, though Landholders in such black spots could get up to $90,000 for re-establishment purposes, this being closer to the (1994) price of a house in a major centre (Queensland Department of Primary Industries 1994: 17) . The idea was to promote rapid and extensive adjustment, thereby eventually reducing demands on governments from landholders in these regions.
Agriculture Advancing Australia
In 1996, the Rural Adjustment Scheme was again reviewed. • to help individual farm businesses profit from change;
• to provide positive incentives for on-going farm adjustment;
• to encourage social and economic development in rural areas; and
• to ensure the farm sector had access to an adequate welfare safety net (Anderson 1997) . 
Reviewing the Rural Adjustment Programs
The direct impact of the government programs on overall adjustment in rural industries has been very limited. Over the last 33 years, governments have funded only a small percentage of 'industry exits' with most adjustment being driven by 'autonomous' responses to socioeconomic factors. Similarly, most of the production and business re-structuring amongst the remaining agricultural firms has been funded by commercially obtained and priced capital rather than from government subsidised finance. In addition, rural adjustment schemes appear to be rather inequitable, with other sectors having to accept major change with little or no adjustment funding. For example, according to Stayner (1994: 2): While some major manufacturing sectors were subject to plans which included some adjustment funding, programs were usually time-limited. Furthermore, the rural adjustment schemes are internally discriminatory in that they generally help the owners of property while rural workers, who are routinely and often quickly 'adjusted' in periods of drought and commodity price downturns, have usually had to fend for themselves. There are however, some arguments for different treatment of farmers.
Perhaps opening up of the economy and the lingering protection of EU and US farmers combine to adversely affect the rural sector, the sugar industry being a case in point. Therefore, it is argued, if other sectors benefit from this opening up, the adversely affected sector is entitled to some adjustment assistance. implication that all those who leave the land do so reluctantly, whereas at least some are seeking greater economic and social opportunities.
Despite the weakness of these various arguments for 'special treatment', politically astute governments know that rural mythology still has some power, especially in the post-Hanson era. Hence, there is a need to subscribe, at least to some extent, to that mythology and to appear to alleviate the sufferings of the 'salt of the earth'. In addition, there has been a genuine concern about rural poverty. One assumption, underlying the schemes has been that farm poverty is the result of slower than optimal rates of adjustment. This was the conclusion of research undertaken into farm poverty as part of the Henderson Inquiry in the 1970s which recommended that adjustment assistance was the appropriate mechanism for addressing low incomes (Henderson 1975: 185 (a) to provide financial assistance to farmers who are unable to meet day-to-day living expenses and cannot obtain commercial loans; and (b) to provide a financial incentive for such persons to leave farming.
(Farm Household Support Act 1992, Section 6)
These clearly place the purpose of the legislation as facilitating structural adjustment rather than purely delivering welfare support.
Rural adjustment programs may have helped wean farmers off various forms of assistance, which had been described in the early 1970s as 'a bewildering array of policy instruments' (Throsby 1972: 13 
Conclusions
Australia's rural reconstruction/adjustment schemes provide a good barometer of the overall policy approach being applied to agricultural policy over time. From the 1940s, farm incomes were an explicit focus of rural policy, which was highly interventionist and government support was provided on an ad hoc basis largely in response to industry requests. By the 1970s, rural policy was being formulated in the context of economy wide policy and was moving away from industry-byindustry support. The rural policy green paper and the formation of the Industries Assistance Commission signalled the injection of increased economic rationality into the policy debate (Warhurst 1982) . This trend continued through the 1980s and 1990s as statutory marketing schemes were dismantled, regulation removed and, as a result of general macro-economic policy, the sector was further exposed to the international economy. As neoliberal economic principles were embraced by the Hawke and Keating governments, successive versions of the rural adjustment scheme were more sharply focused on farming as a business. The replacement of the Rural Adjustment Scheme with the AAA package did not greatly alter the underlying philosophy of farm support, the major exception arguably being the refocusing of the exceptional circumstances program towards welfare support in 1999
In spite of the incremental, though sometimes sporadic development of rural adjustment policy along the neoliberal path, concerns about the welfare of farm families continued to be raised and programs which were designed to facilitate farm business adjustment also contained measures to alleviate personal hardship.
The rationales for including welfare components in what are essentially industry policy measures rested on an amalgam of arguments relating to equity, agrarian sentiment and economic theory. Across the developed world, farmers continue to attract, and exploit, general public sympathy for agriculture as a fundamental and 'special' activity (Botterill 2004) . This can reveal itself in justifications for intervention that encompass arguments that the difficulty farmers face is beyond their control, that it is the result of previous government policy, that adjustment will result in poverty and social dislocation, that adjustment is proceeding at a sub-optimal rate due to market failure and so on. This provides a potent mix in support of government intervention, particularly in times of drought when a largely uninformed media arouses public sympathy through iconic images of rural hardship (Wahlquist 2003) , or when populist politics in the regions is electorally significant.
In 1997, then Minister for Primary Industries and Energy John Anderson (1997) argued that This statement underlines both the shift in direction that governments have been attempting over the past three decades as well as the residual sensitivity within what is essentially an industry portfolio, to the welfare consequences of policy.
While the neoliberal approach has influenced the direction of rural adjustment policy in Australia incrementally, it is clear that agrarian sentiment and political pragmatism continue to ensure that rural adjustment programs in Australia will contain a welfare component.
